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CASE NOTES
TORT DAMAGES-PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROPERLY
AWARDED AGAINST INTOXICATED DRIVERS-Taylor
v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr.
693 (1979)
Cameron Taylor, plaintiff and petitioner, filed suit in the
Superior Court of the State of California seeking compensa-
tory and punitive damages for injuries allegedly sustained in
an automobile accident.1 Taylor's complaint alleged that
Claire William Stille, defendant and real party in interest,
caused his automobile to collide with the plaintiff's, thereby
seriously injuring the plaintiff. Taylor also alleged that the de-
fendant was consuming alcoholic beverages while driving, was
intoxicated at the time of the accident, and was a chronic al-
coholic "'well aware of the serious nature of his alcoholism'
... and the dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated."'
In addition, the complaint alleged that defendant Stille had a
long history of traffic accidents, arrests, and convictions stem-
ming from his use of alcohol, that the defendant had accepted
employment requiring him to transport alcoholic beverages,
and that the defendant was transporting such beverages at
the time of the accident.3 Based on these allegations, Taylor
asserted that Stifle "'acted with a conscious disregard of
Plaintiff[s] safety ... .' " Taylor, therefore, sought the recov-
ery of punitive damages.5
Stille demurred, contending the complaint did not allege
actual intent to cause an accident or injury and therefore did
not state a cause of action for punitive damages.' After the
trial court sustained the demurrer, Taylor petitioned the Cali-
0 1980 by John F. Farbstein
1. Taylor v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693,
(1979).
2. Id. at 893, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
3. Id.
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fornia Supreme Court for a writ of mandate.7 The court issued
a peremptory writ overruling the demurrer and reinstating
Taylor's cause of action for punitive damages, holding that a
defendant who voluntarily commences consumption of alco-
holic beverages to the point of intoxication knowing, that he
must thereafter drive, demonstrates a conscious disregard of
the safety of others. 8 Therefore, those who become intoxicated
knowing that they must thereafter drive act with malice suffi-
cient to justify assessment of punitive damages.
In reaching its decision, the court examined the "statu-
tory and decisional law"' authorizing punitive awards against
defendants who, in committing a tort, act with malice. The
court began by reviewing prior judicial interpretation of mal-
ice under California Civil Code section 3294, the statutory ba-
sis of all punitive damage awards in California. 0 The court
noted that prior decisions described malice under section 3294,
as "'malice in fact, as opposed to malice implied by law
I ' "11 and as "'an act conceived in a spirit of mischief or
with criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to
others.' 123 The court reiterated their recent judicial charac-
terization of malice as "'a conscious disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights,' ,8 and rejected the trial court's basis" for up-
7. Id. at 893-94, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695. The court noted:
Although we rarely grant extraordinary relief at the pleading stage of a
lawsuit, mandamus will lie when it it appears that the trial court has
deprived a party of an opportunity to plead his cause of action or de-
fense and when extraordinary relief may prevent a needless and expen-
sive trial and reversal.
Id. at 894, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
8. Id. at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
9. Id. at 894, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695-96.
10. Id. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, ex-
press or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.
11. 24 Cal. 3d at 894, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (quoting Bertero v.
National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 66, 529 P.2d 608, 624-25, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184,
200-01 (1974)).
12. 24 Cal. 3d at 894, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695-96 (quoting Ebaugh
v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708 (1972)).
13. 24 Cal. 3d at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (quoting Neal v.
Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922, 582 P.2d 980, 986, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389,
395 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
14. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
TAYLOR v. SUPERIOR COURT
holding Stifle's demurrer.' The court concurred with the
ruling in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,'e "that a con-
scious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice
within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code.' 7
The court carefully distinguished Gombos v. Ashe,"s
which held that similar allegations of disregard for the safety
of others's did not constitute malice under section 3294 and
hence did not state a cause of action for punitive damages.20
The Taylor court noted that Gombos was decided prior tojudicial acceptance of punitive damages awards based on a
finding of "defendant's conscious disregard of the safety of
others."' "2 The court held that the essential allegations of
Gombos, namely, voluntary intoxication and driving while in-
toxicated, were sufficient to sustain a cause of action for puni-
tive damages, and overruled Gombos' contrary holding.2 The
court commented that Taylor's complaint alleged facts suffi-
cient to support a finding of a conscious disregard of safety
even absent the additional allegations of the defendant's prior
drunk driving record and chronic alcoholism.'s
In adopting this rule, the court emphasized the deterrent
function of placing punitive liability directly on the drinking
driver. 4 The court indicated its concern with the great public
hazard created by drunk drivers by citing numerous statistics
and studies showing that at least one half of all fatal accidents
and one third of all injury accidents are related to the con-
sumption of alcohol.2 The court reasoned that this "severe
15. 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
16. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
17. 24 Cal. 3d at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (1979).
18. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1955).
19. In Gombos v. Ashe, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant acted with "ab-
solute disregard and callous indifference to the rights and safety of all persons on[the] highway" by overindulging in alcoholic beverages and subsequently operating a
motor vehicle, "knowing that at said time and place the alcoholic refreshments con-
sumed by him rendered him physically unfit to operate a motor vehicle ... and a
menace to all persons using said highway . Id. at 526, 322 P.2d at 939.
20. Id. at 526-27, 322 P.2d at 939.
21. 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
22. Id. at 896, 900, 598 P.2d at 857, 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697, 699-700.
23. Id. at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
24. Id. at 897, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98. See CAL. CIv. CODE§ 3294 (West 1970); Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973) (holding that
the imposition of a punitive award against a negligent drunk driver was properly used
to deter others).
25. 24 Cal. 3d at 897-99, 598 P.2d at 857-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
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threat to public safety"26 justified the harsh remedy of impos-
ing punitive damages directly on the drinking driver.",
The court considered, and rejected, the defendant's con-
tention that alcoholics lack the volitional control associated
with malice in fact. The court concluded that volition was a
question of fact to be resolved at trial.'8 The court also re-
jected Stifle's argument that the conscious disregard of safety
test, if applicable to drunk driving cases, would also apply to
willful violations of other traffic laws. The court specifically
limited its holding to drunk driving cases.'
Chief Justice Bird and Justice Newman concurred in the
judgment, but disagreed with the court's expansive holding. In
their view, only the allegations of Stille's habitual drunk driv-
ing supported the cause of action for punitive damages3a
They concluded that most drunk drivers are not sufficiently
aware of the probability of harm to possess the requisite mal-
ice justifying punitive damages.8 1
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Clark raised three princi-
pal objections. First, Clark questioned the court's imposition
of punitive damages given the following factors: (1) compensa-
tory damages fully compensate injured plaintiffs;8' (2) crimi-
nal law is the better vehicle for punishing wrongful conduct;38
(3) punitive awards "interfere with policies governing trial
procedures"" and "distract the trier of fact from its liability
function;"' 5 (4) the deterrent effect may only be marginal;"
(5) punitive awards may exonerate liability insurers from pay-
ing the compensatory award to the plaintiff;8 7 and, (6) the de-
26. Id. at 899, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 899-900, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
30. Id. at 901, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700. But see id. at 896, 598
P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
31. Id. at 901, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
32. Id. at 902, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
33. Justice Clark noted that criminal triers of fact are guided by standards set
by the legislature whereas no standards exist for punitive awards. Id. at 902, 598 P.2d
at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
34. Id. at 902, 598 P.2d at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
35. Id. at 903, 598 P.2d at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
36. See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
37. According to Justice Clark, punitive damages are traditionally not covered
by insurance in California, and in cases where they are awarded, both the compensa-
tory and punitive awards are paid out-of-pocket by the defendant. Therefore, plain-
tiffs risk the chance of being completely uncompensated by seeking a punitive award
[Vol. 201016
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fendant may not be able to seek comparative fault relief from
the plaintiff.38 Clark suggested that these factors dictate the
punitive damages should be awarded with the greatest caution
in accident cases.,9
Justice Clark took issue with the court's interpretation of
malice under California Civil Code section 3294. Clark noted
that prior cases allowed punitive awards under the conscious
disregard of safety theory where either the defendant was
"aware both of the plaintiff and that his conduct [would]
cause plaintiff injury""' or where "although injury to the
plaintiff was uncertain, it was probable that the outrageous
conduct would result in injury to someone. 4 1 Clark disagreed
with the court's finding that Taylor's allegations pointed to an
awareness of probable injury sufficient to justify an award of
punitive damages. He commented that the typical drinker
"sets out to drink without becoming intoxicated, and because
alcohol distorts judgment, . . overrates his capacity, and
misjudges his driving ability after drinking too much. 4 2 Jus-
tice Clark concluded that the court's interpretation of the
conscious disregard of safety test amounted to "negligence."'"
Clark based his third objection to the majority decision
on his doubt that imposing punitive damages would deter in-
toxicated drivers. He noted that the following factors diluted
the deterrence effect: (1) criminal penalties already exist; (2)
the chance of self-injury is at least as great as that of injury to
others; (3) accidents are fortuitous and unintended events;
and, (4) punitive damages are discretionary award.
against a poor but insured defendant. Id. at 904, 598 P.2d at 862, 157 Cal. Rptr. at703-05. See CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972), which provides in part: "An insurer is
not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured." See also Gray v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
38. Justice Clark impliedly argued that plaintiffs successful in recovering puni-
tive damages will escape comparative fault because the defendant's conduct justifying
the exemplary award may be construed as wilful misconduct. 24 Cal. 3d at 906, 598
P.2d at 863, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 907, 598 P.2d at 864, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04.
41. Id. (emphasis in original) Clark also observed that these cases involved
maintenance of a dangerous condition, see, e.g., Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 137 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1977); or, wide distribution of a known dan-gerous product, see, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122
Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
42. 24 Cal. 3d at 908, 598 P.2d at 864, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (1979).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 909-10, 598 P.2d at 865-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 705. Clark also expressed
19801 1017
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Taylor continues the California Supreme Court's effort to
deter drunk driving,"4 but whether the decision will have a de-
terrent effect will depend on the public's knowledge of the
new rule and the availability of insurance coverage for puni-
tive damages."' Taylor marks a growing trend allowing puni-
tive damages to be imposed against defendants whose conduct
was previously characterized as merely negligent or reckless.
There are many violations of safety laws from which a jury
could reasonably conclude that a defendant consciously disre-
garded the safety of others, however, California courts may be
reluctant to extend the Taylor rule to analogous situations.
In any event, Taylor imposes liability on defendants hereto-
fore viewed as lacking the volition and malice justifying the
imposition of punitive damages.
John F. Farbstein
concern that "[i]f drunken drivers may obtain insurance protection for losses caused
by conduct warranting punitive awards the deterrent effects of both compensatory
and punitive liability is further diluted." Id. at 905 n.3, 598 P.2d at 863 n.3, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 707 n.3. Although Clark speculated that present law in California made such
possibility remote, compare id. and Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973)
with Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 2d 199, 205, 567 P.2d 1013, 1023 (1977)
(dissenting opinion). The court in the latter case allowed the defendant's insurance
company to pay the punitive award.
45. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Ct., 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978) (imposing liability on third party hosts for serving intoxicated per-
sons); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (imposing
liability on alcoholic beverage vendors for serving intoxicated persons).
46. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
47. See 24 Cal. 3d at 899-900, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699. However,
the California State Courts of Appeal appear willing to apply Taylor retroactively.
See Busboom v. Superior Ct., 113 Cal. App. 3d 550, 169 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1980). Cf.
Dawes v. Superior Ct., 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1980) (allowing puni-
tive damages where the defendant's conduct demonstrated a conscious disregard of
safety independent from the defendant's "decision to drive and ...driving in an
intoxicated condition.") Id. at 88, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 322. But see Mau v. Superior
Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 875, 161 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1980), where the court refused to
apply Taylor retroactively. The Mau court reasoned that retroactive application of
Taylor was incompatible with the deterrence rationale for awarding punitive dam-
ages. Id. at 881-81, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 898. The Mau and Busboom decisions directly
conflict, and may invite the California Supreme Court to render a decision on the
retroactivity issue.
ANTITRUST-BLANKET LICENSING AS EMPLOYED
IN THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY DOES NOT CONSTI-
TUTE PRICE-FIXING, A PER SE VIOLATION OF THE
SHERMAN ACT-Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) operate as
"clearinghouses" 1 for copyright owners and licensees to solve
the problems associated with the licensing of music. Copyright
owners grant to these organizations the right to license the
nondramatic performances" of their musical compositions.
BMI and ASCAP issue licenses, primarily blanket licenses,3
and distribute royalties according to a schedule' based partly
on the nature and amount of use of the music. A blanket li-
cense gives the licensee the right to use any and all of the
compositions owned by members or affiliates of the licensor as
often as desired during the term of the license. In 1969, after
BMI had notified CBS of its intent to terminate a blanket li-
cense following the two companies' failure to reach an agree-
ment on higher fees, CBS wrote to both BMI and ASCAP re-
0 1980 Lee Ann Gilbert
1. The analogy is to a bank clearinghouse, based on the functions performed by
BMI and ASCAP for their members and for users of their music. ASCAP and BMI
license compositions in their repertories, collect license fees, monitor users to detect
incidences of infringement, and initiate legal proceedings to redress infringement.
Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The ASCAP Con-
sent Judgment of 1950, 19 L. & CoNrEMP. PROB. 294, 298 (1954).
2. Licensing of performances of copyrighted music is a right owned solely by the
copyright holder for the term of the copyright. Performing rights societies, such as
BMI and ASCAP, are not interested in licensing dramatic plays, musical comedies,
and operas, because the substantial advance preparations required to perform dra-
matic works allow sufficient time to negotiate with individual copyright owners.
Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest-Regulation of Performing Right
Societies, 19 L. & CoNTraMP. PROB. 275, 283 (1954).
3. Fees for a blanket license are either a percentage of total revenue or a flat
dollar amount. Most contracts require payment of a minimum amount even for peri-
ods during which no licensed compositions are used. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp.
737, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
4. The schedule of royalties reflects the nature of the music, the nature of its
use by the licensee, the duration of the use, the popularity of the music, and the
seniority of the composer within either ASCAP or BMI. United States v. ASCAP,[1950-19511 TRADE CASES (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. ASCAP,
119601 TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 69,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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questing each of them to submit the terms upon which they
would individually be willing to issue a performance rights li-
cense whose fees reflected the actual use of the music. When
neither BMI nor ASCAP agreed with its request, CBS chose
not to discuss other alternatives to the proposed per-use li-
cense 5 and the proffered blanket license and brought suit.
In its complaint, CBS charged that the issuance of blan-
ket licenses by BMI and ASCAP was (1) illegal price-fixing,6
(2) a misuse of copyrights 7 and (3) a restraint of trade.8
The United States District Court held that, because di-
rect negotiation with individual copyright owners for direct li-
censes was both available and feasible, issuance of blanket li-
censes by BMI and ASCAP was not restraint of trade, misuse
of copyrights, or illegal price-fixing.' The rationale was CBS
had failed to prove the following: either that it had purchased
blanket licenses under compulsion or that the price it had
paid was fixed; that BMI or ASCAP had actually refused to
negotiate with CBS for alternative methods of licensing; and
that the licensing of performances of music necessary to its
network programming could not be obtained through any pos-
sible alternate combination of direct licensing 0 and per-pro-
gram licensing.1"
5. A per-use license is a license, fees for which are to be specified for each per-
formance of a composition in the repertory, plus an administrative fee. This defini-
tion generally describes CBS's proposed per-use license. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp.
737, 747 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. Illegal price-fixing is the cooperative raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity, either among competitors or by controlling re-
sale price in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Coercion is not an essential ele-
ment of price-fixing. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59
(1940).
7. Misuse of copyrights is either a refusal to issue a license, an interference with
other available means of obtaining a license, or the compelling of a party to obtain
rights under a license which the licensee did not want. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp.
737, 781-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
8. Restraint of trade is unreasonable interference with either the ordinary,
usual and freely-competitive pricing or the distribution system of the open market, or
those restraints of trade, ordinarily reasonable, which are unreasonable because they
are accompanied by specific intent to effect a forbidden restraint. United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
9. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 780-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. CBS and all potential licensees of musical compositions always have the op-
tion of attempting to obtain a "direct" or "individual" license from the copyright
owner. Such a license gives the licensee the right to use a specific composition on
bargained for terms. Id. at 744.
11. A per-program license is a license to use any compositions in the licensor's
BMI v. CBS
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling on these three issues, holding that the
blanket licenses issued to CBS, and to all other television net-
works, were a form of price-fixing which is illegal per se under
the Sherman Antitrust Act,1 ' and that the issuance of blanket
licenses was a misuse of copyrights. s Finding that the blanket
license reduced price competition among the authors, compos-
ers, publishers, and other copyright owners who are members
of BMI and ASCAP, the Second Circuit concluded that lack
of incentive to compete might be cured if ASCAP and BMI
were required to provide some form of per-use license. The
court determined that individual composers could price direct
licenses so as to compete effectively against per-use licenses.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether a blanket license violates the per se rule of
price-fixing and constitutes a misuse of copyrights." The
Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment, ruling unani-
mously that the per se rule under the Sherman Antitrust Act
is not violated by blanket licensing practices in the television
industry, and that since the per se rule was not applicable, a
finding of copyright misuse could not stand. The case was re-
manded to the Second Circuit for further proceedings that
were to include an assessment, under the rule of reason,15 of
repertory (here the potential licensors are BMI and ASCAP) for the particular pro-
gram. Fees are determined by the number of programs using compositions in the
licensor's repertory. Such a license is in essence a "mini-blanket" license. CBS v.
ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1977).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. I 1980) provides in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony . ..
13. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
14. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
15. The Court referred to the test stated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 65 (1910) as the proper statement of the rule of reason. In National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), the Court paraphrased
the Standard Oil test,
The test is. . .whether the challenged contracts or acts "were un-
reasonably restrictive of competitive conditions." Unreasonableness
under that test could be based either (1) on the nature or character of
the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the in-
ference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and
enhance prices. Under either branch of the test, the inquiry is confined
to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions.
1980] 1021
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the blanket license as employed in the television industry."
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether
the blanket licensing practices of ASCAP and BMI violate the
per se rule of price-fixing. The test for applying the per se rule
is to focus on
whether the effect and ... the purpose of the practice is
to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly
free market economy . . ., and in what portion of the
market, or instead one designed to "increase economic
efficiency and render markets more rather than less
competitive. 17
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Court found
that the practice of blanket licensing of performing rights of
copyrighted music is not per se illegal. Rather blanket licens-
ing "accompanies the integration of sales, monitoring, and en-
forcement against unauthorized copyright use.""8
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court applied
the "per se rule with a Market-Functioning exception"19 and
affirmed the court of appeals' holding "that price-fixing is per
se illegal except where it is absolutely necessary for the mar-
ket to function at all."' 20 The Court found the blanket license
to be a somewhat different product than the direct license be-
cause it eliminates the need for negotiations with individual
composers and offers substantial savings in time and lower
costs.2 1 Although the packaging of a license with a negotiation
service, such as both BMI and ASCAP provide, creates a mar-
ket in which individual composers are inherently unable to
compete, the increased availabilty of compositions due to this
Id. at 690.
16. 441 U.S. at 25. The decision was eight to one, but the dissent agreed with
the major holding of the case. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with
the majority on whether the issue of assessment of blanket licensing under the rule of
reason was still before the court of appeals. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
17. 441 U.S. at 19-20 (citing as authority United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U.S. 422 n.13, 441 n.16 (1978)). The Court continues, qualifying the
simplified test: "that is, whether the practice facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. ... Id.
19-20.
18. Id. at 20. The Court sees the blanket license as a practical solution devel-
oped by those elements in the marketplace whose rights were threatened by the ab-
sence of effective means of monitoring use and enforcing payment of use royalties.
19. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1977).
20. Id.
21. 441 U.S. at 21-22.
[Vol. 201022
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lowering of cost and savings in time benefits not only the li-
censee but also the licensor and the composer.
The Court's denial of the claim of price-fixing was further
based on a consideration of the restrictions placed on both
BMI and ASCAP by consent decrees,22 a consideration which
was crucial to a characterization of the licensing practices of
BMI and ASCAP as violative of the Sherman Act.23 Both
BMI and ASCAP are subject to consent decrees, but the re-
strictions imposed on the licensing practices of each organiza-
tion are different. Only ASCAP is limited by consent decrees
to obtaining only non-exclusive rights from its affiliates and to
allowing its fees to be scrutinized by the district court in the
event of disagreements between ASCAP and its licensees.2
The Court postulated equal treatment, concluding that since
ASCAP could not be guilty of price-fixing, neither could
BMI.25
As to ASCAP and its members and affiliates, CBS's
charge of price-fixing ignores the consent decree issued by the
United States District Court in 195026 which provides that the
district court will set fees for licenses and royalties, if any dis-
pute should arise as to the reasonableness of such fees. Be-
cause ASCAP does not ultimately set the price for its blanket
licenses it cannot be guilty of price-fixing.
Secondly, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of mis-
use of copyrights. The Supreme Court agreed with the Second
Circuit's analysis that a finding of misuse of copyright was de-
22. A consent decree is not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties,
but is a recordation of the terms of the agreement reached by parties who are compe-
tent to contract. The decree is binding on the parties, but not on the court. A decree
by consent is not reviewable upon a writ of error or upon appeal, nor may it be
reheard. A consent decree is not res judicata upon the parties because it involves no
litigation on the merits. Consaer v. Wisnicwski, 293 Ill. App. 529, 529, 13 N.E.2d 93,
94 (1938).
23. 441 U.S. at 13.
24. Compare United States v. ASCAP, [1950-1951] TRADE CASES 62,595
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), and United States v. ASCAP, [1940-1943] TRADE CASES 1 56,104
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) with United States v. BMI, [1940-19431 TRADE CASES 56,096
(E.D.Wis. 1941) and United States v. BMI, [1966] TRADE CASES 71,941 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
25. The Supreme Court relied on a stipulation by the parties at trial to elimi-
nate the need for separate analyses of each defendant, and to support equal treat-
ment of the defendants by the Supreme Court's judgment. 441 U.S. at 12 n.20.
26. United States v. ASCAP, [1950-19511 TRADE CASES 62,595 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). This decree amended an earlier decree, United States v. ASCAP [1940-19431
TRADE CASES 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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pendent upon a finding of per se illegal price-fixing.2 7 There-
fore, having found no illegal price-fixing, the Court summarily
concluded that the blanket licensing practice was not copy-
right misuse.2 a
Thirdly, the Court addressed the issue of restraint of
trade. Whereas the Supreme Court found no per se illegal
price fixing activity, it acknowledged that under the rule of
reason the blanket licensing practices of both BMI and AS-
CAP might be characterized as a restraint of trade. A majority
of the Court concluded that the issue of restraint of trade was
not properly before it, remanding the case to the Second Cir-
cuit for a factual analysis of blanket licensing in the television
industry under the rule of reason, which is to include consid-
eration of the policies expressed in the several consent decrees
to which ASCAP and BMI are subject.
The Supreme Court held, unanimously, that blanket li-
censing of nondramatic performances of copyrighted music is
not per se illegal, nor a misuse of copyrights, and that such
licenses should be judged by the rule of reason rather than by
the per se standard. The Court remanded the case for a fac-
tual analysis under the rule of reason. 9
Within the facts of this case, then, the Supreme Court
has reversed its long-standing opinion that price-fixing is al-
ways per se illegal.80 Although the lower federal courts have
long distinguished between per se illegal price-fixing and lit-
eral price-fixing,8 1 the United States Supreme Court has not
made such a distinction before this case. Supreme Court ap-
plication of the market necessity concept to future cases will
no doubt be limited to fact patterns which closely approxi-
mate the circumstances of blanket licensing in the broadcast-
27. 441 U.S. at 6, 8.
28. Id. at 24.
29. The sole dissent was directed to the majority's decision to remand the case
for analysis under the rule of reason. Justice Stevens concluded that the issue of
whether the blanket license of performances of copyrighted music is unlawful under
the rule of reason was properly before the Supreme Court and that the weight of
authority required a finding that the practice was an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Id. 25-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213 (1940), the
Supreme Court concluded that the rule of reason stated in Standard Oil had not
changed the status of price-fixing as a per se illegal violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.
31. See K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. den. 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
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ing industry. The question remains whether blanket licensing
is unreasonable restraint of trade. Although this issue was re-
manded to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court, in dicta,
directed the Second Circuit's ruling.32 The Second Circuit, re-
lying on the extensive fact-finding of the trial court and the
guidance of the Supreme Court, held the practice of blanket
licensing to be reasonable under the circumstances of the tele-
vision broadcasting industry.3 Taking the case as a whole, the
majority presents the view that because blanket licensing
when properly regulated, fills a legitimate need of both copy-
right owners and licensees, it is a reasonable and functional
practice, not an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Lee Ann Gilbert
32. 441 U.S. at 13-16. The Court speaks of the amicus brief filed by the United
States Department of Justice in the present case, the amicus brief filed by the Justice
Department in K-91, and the portions of the 1976 Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.
§§ 111(d)(5)(A), 116(c)(4), 118(b) (Supp. II 1978)), which suggest forms of pooling
and blanket licensing as legitimate options open to copyright owners. See generally
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. 111978). These sources conclude either directly or indi-
rectly that there are economically beneficial applications of the blanket license in
some circumstances, and that the practice is not an unreasonable restraint of trade.
33. CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
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